| IA-5 |
Authenticator Management |
Eight vault backend implementations (Keychain, 1Password, HashiCorp Vault, KeePassXC, encrypted-file, systemd-creds, Bitwarden, Keeper). Credentials are stored, rotated, and accessed via the vault’s native APIs — aquaman never persists them itself. |
test/compliance/nist/ia-5-authenticator-mgmt.test.ts |
| AC-3 |
Access Enforcement |
Per-service request-policy engine evaluates method + path against allow/deny rules before credentials are injected. Denied requests return 403 and never reach the upstream provider. The UDS path is gated by 0o600 socket-file permissions; the opt-in loopback listener (Hermes path) is gated by a per-install token (constant-time compare) — requests without a valid token get 401 before any credential work, and /_health is the only exemption. |
unit: ac-3-access-enforcement.test.ts + integration via t0012-valid-accounts.test.ts (403 round-trip) + loopback token gate in loopback-listener.test.ts |
| AC-6 |
Least Privilege |
The broker endpoint (v0.12.0+) materializes credentials per tool call with a short-lived TTL (default 60s, max 3600s). The agent’s shell environment holds the credential only for the duration of one command, not for the agent process lifetime. The aquaman-hermes plugin observes least privilege from the other side: it consults only *_BASE_URL env vars, never *_API_KEY — it has no need for, and no access to, the credential. |
covered by AC-3 test + broker tests in test/e2e/credential-proxy.test.ts + hermes/tests/test_compliance.py |
| SC-12 |
Cryptographic Key Establishment & Management |
Vault backends are operator-chosen and operator-managed. Aquaman delegates key-management responsibilities to the chosen backend (Keychain, Vault, etc.) rather than rolling its own. |
covered by IA-5 test |
| SC-28 |
Protection of Information at Rest |
Audit log is written chmod 0o600 to ~/.aquaman/audit/current.jsonl. Credentials at rest live in the vault backend (operator-chosen encryption). Aquaman’s own writes (auth-profiles.json, config.yaml) use 0o600. |
test/compliance/nist/sc-28-protection-at-rest.test.ts |
| AU-2 |
Audit Events |
Every credential access and policy decision produces an audit event with RequestInfo carrying id, service, method, path, statusCode, authenticated. Loopback (Hermes) requests flow through the same audited request path as UDS — the listener is not an audit bypass. |
au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts (same fixture covers AU-2/9/10) + loopback path in loopback-listener.test.ts |
| AU-9 |
Protection of Audit Information |
Audit log is hash-chained (every entry contains the SHA-256 of the previous entry plus its own data). Tampering with any entry invalidates the chain from that point forward. Log is chmod 0o600. |
test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts |
| AU-10 |
Non-Repudiation |
The hash chain provides non-repudiation: any mutation, insertion, or deletion of an entry breaks the chain and is detectable via AuditLogger.verifyIntegrity(). |
test/compliance/nist/au-10-tamper-evident.test.ts |
| SI-10 |
Information Input Validation |
Secret-pattern redactor scrubs known credential shapes (AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, OpenAI, Anthropic, JWTs, PEM private keys, …) from agent inputs/outputs. Service names + key names validated against safe regex before vault lookup. The Hermes aquaman_status tool/command validates its output discipline too — it surfaces only non-secret metadata (origin host:port + env var names), never the token or a key value. |
si-10-input-validation.test.ts + output discipline in hermes/tests/test_compliance.py |